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1 Introduction
The ‘problem of time’ is a cluster of interpretational and formal issues
in the foundations of general relativity relating to both the representa-
tion of time in the classical canonical formalism, and to the quantization
of the theory. The problem was first noticed by Bergmann and Dirac in
the late 1950s, and is still a topic of intense debate in contemporary
physics and philosophy of physics. The purpose of this short chapter is
to provide an accessible introduction to the problem, and this will in-
evitably mean that many signifiant technical details will be obscured or
over simplified. The most significant simplification that we will make is
to focus exclusively on the global aspect of the the problem of time. That
is, we will, for the most part, restrict ourselves to the ‘disappearance of
time’ in theories invariant under global time reparametrizations. This
restriction inevitably means that the important and philosophically rich
subtleties relating to local time reparametrizations (refoliations) will not
be considered in much detail. Furthermore, in the presentation below I
have chosen to focus on a particular dialectic, drawn from the contrast
between the views of Barbour and Rovelli, as a means to illustrate my
own views. As such the treatment here is claimed to be neither com-
prehensive, nor entirely neutral. The reader in search of discussions of
the problem of time seen from a wider viewpoint and described in its
full technical splendour, is directed towards the research literature in
physics and philosophy of physics.1
∗Forthcoming in the Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Physics edited by
Eleanor Knox and Alastair Wilson
†email:karim.thebault@bristol.ac.uk
1A comprehensive monograph devoted to the problem is (Anderson 2017). The
three main physics review articles are (Isham 1992; Kuchar˘ 1991; Anderson 2012).
Two exemplary modern discussion are (Pons et al. 2010) and (Gambini et al. 2009).
The best physics ‘textbook’ dicussions are in (Rovelli 2004; Thiemann 2007). Techni-
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2 Leibniz and the Problem of Time
Like many of the deepest conceptual problems in modern physics, im-
portant aspects of the problem of time in quantum gravity can be traced
back to debates within early modern natural philosophy. Of particular
importance is Leibniz’s critique of the Newtonian absolute conception
of time. In particular, Leibniz’s assertion that ‘instants, consider’d with-
out the things, are nothing at all; and that they consist only in the suc-
cessive order of things’ (Alexander 1998, p.26-7). The first half of this
quote contains a negative critique of absolute time along the lines of
what has been called ‘Aristotle’s principle’ – there cannot be changeless
duration. The second half of the quote then puts forward the kernel
of Leibniz’s positive view – that time is an ‘order of successions’. Al-
though it is remarkably subtle, and arguably not entirely consistent, it
will prove instructive to our discussion to consider Leibniz’s positive
metaphysics of time in a little detail. In particular, rather surprisingly,
Leibniz’s metaphysical vocabulary will be found to be well suited to
distinguishing between modern approaches to the problem of time ad-
vocated by Julian Barbour and Carlo Rovelli. For the most part our dis-
cussion of Leibniz’s metaphysics of time draws upon the magisterial
scholarship of Richard Arthur (1985, 2014) other relevant sources will
be indicated as appropriate.
An instructive starting point distinction made in the contemporary
literature (although not endorsed by Arthur) is between three ‘levels
of reality’ in Leibniz’s mature metaphysics.2 At the most basic level,
what is real for Leibniz are simple substances which alone have true
unity. These are the famously obscure monads. Next, we have the ‘phe-
nomenal level’ that is made up of phenomena bene funda – well founded
phenomena – that, due to pre-established harmony, are accurate reflec-
tions of the real and actual monadic states. Finally, we have the ideal
level which, by contrast, is made up of entia rationis – abstract or fic-
tional things – that include ‘phenomena’ founded upon possible but
non-actual monadic states. Crucially, although both the phenomenal
and the ideal levels can include things which are infinite, all concepts
that depending upon the continuum are only applicable to the ideal
realm. Thus, if we were to define time as the real line, R, then this
concept of time could only be represented for Leibniz as an entia ra-
tionis and thus ideal. Furthermore, phenomenal things for Leibniz can
only acquire their status as phenomena bene funda by their grounding
upon the actual. They must always be understood as representations or
perceptions of the monads of the actual world.
Leibniz’s view of the ontological status of relations is subtle and
cally informed philosophical dicussions are (Belot and Earman 2001; Earman 2002;
Maudlin 2002; Belot 2007; The´bault 2012; Gryb and The´bault 2015; Pitts 2014a; Gryb
and The´bault 2016) and (Rickles 2007, §7).
2See for example (Winterbourne 1982; Hartz and Cover 1988).
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significant for his view of time. Following Arthur (2014) (who is follow-
ing (Mugani 2012)) we can take Leibniz to believe that relations such
as situation and succession supervene on intrinsic modifications of the
monads: changes in their perceptions and appetition. Thus, with regard
to time, real temporal relations of succession, both between the states of
the same monad and the states of different monads, are founded upon
the appetitive activity of individual monads. We can then consider no-
tions of time relevant to each of the ‘three levels’ defined above. On
the fundamental level of the real monads or the actual world, all we
have are changes of the monadic states which are coordinated via the
principle of pre-established harmony. The phenomenal level consists of
well founded phenomena arise as representations (perceptions) of the
actual monads. At this level we have both actual time ordering and also
actual durations. Finally, at the ideal level of entia rationis we have pos-
sible time orderings and also possible durations. Rich and sophisticated
though it may be, the Leibnizian metaphysics of time runs into two im-
mediate problems. Each of which foreshadows an important aspect of
the problem of time in quantum gravity. First, what determines the ‘or-
der of succession’ of phenomenal states needed to fix the actual time
ordering? Second, what determines the duration measure needed to fix
the ‘quantity of time’ between actual phenomenal states?
In essence, the first question relates to the the requirement for a
monotonic parametrization of states. That is, an undirected labelling
of temporal states by a parameter which is either always increasing or
always decreasing. An earlier literature (Rescher 1979) follows Russell
(1900) in convicting Leibniz a vicious circularity that requires a non-
relational concept of time at the basic monadic level. In contrast, Arthur
(1985, 2014) convincingly argues that we can understand time at the
monadic level purely in terms of a (non-circular) inter-monadic notion
of temporal succession based upon compossibility. Temporal succession
at the monadic level could then be taken to ground a total ordering of
temporal states in the phenomenal realm.3 This is sufficient to give us
a monotonic parametrization of states and thus a non-directed model
of time as an order of successions. Compossibility is not, however, suf-
ficient to ground a directed ordering temporal states. Such a notion
depends on further structure implicit in the monadic appetition. Since
the question of directed time ordering is rather tangential to the prob-
lem of time we will set it aside and implicitly assume that ‘succession’
has its undirected connotation. See Arthur (1985, 2014) for discussion in
the context of Leibniz and (Kiefer and Zeh 1995) for discussion in the
context of the problem of time.
Let us now turn to the second question regarding duration. This is-
3Arguably, compossibility seems to underdetermine the actual temporal ordering
since it does not give us grounds to distinguish it from merely possible temporal
orderings. See (Cover 1997; De Risi 2007).
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sue seems particularly pressing for Leibniz. In fact, in the famous corre-
spondence with Clarke, arguably the strongest critique Clarke gives of
Leibnizian time is that ‘the order of things succeeding each other in time
is not time itself, for they may succeed each other faster or slower in the
same order of succession, but not in the same time’ (Alexander 1998,
p.52). Leibniz’s response in the correspondence is not entirely clear: he
claims that the quantity of time could not become greater and yet the
order of successions remain the same since ‘if the time is greater, there
will be more successive and like states interposed’ (Alexander 1998,
pp.89-90). On the one hand, although it does seem consistent for Leib-
niz to assert Aristotle’s principle and flatly deny that the distinction
Clarke is making corresponds to a difference. However, on the other,
there is still an appreciable explanatory burden upon Leibniz to pro-
vide an means by which his phenomenal notion of duration can be
quantified. A relational notion of time still requires a determinate met-
ric structure in order for time to play its functional role in mechanics
(De Risi 2007, p.273). There is a strong hint towards a more satisfac-
tory resolution in Leibniz’s late writings. Arthur (Arthur 1985; Arthur
2014), in particular, suggests that Initia rerum mathemat carum metaphysica
(Loemker 1969) contains a line of response via the definition of temporal
distances in terms of ‘maximally determined’ or ‘simplest path’ through
interposed constituents (see also (Vailati 1997, p.136)). Even more tanta-
lisingly, Leibniz wrote in 1680 that ‘the basis for measuring the duration
of things is the agreement obtained by assuming different uniform mo-
tions (like those of different precise clocks)’ (quoted in (Arthur 2014,
p.206)). Furthermore, (Rescher 1979, p.66) suggests that based upon the
principle of perfection we might expect that ‘nomic harmony’ sufficient
to establish a nature phenomenal measure of duration is a contingent
feature of the actual world. These hints not withstanding, Leibnizian
relationalism about time seems to have insufficient resources to give a
relational basis for temporal distances.
Three points from our discussion of Leibniz’s metaphysics of time
will be of particular significance in what follows. First we have the
idea that a relationalist about time, such as Leibniz, may still consis-
tently assert that time orderings are fundamental. That is, a modern
Leibnizian style relationalist about time will look to retain a monotonic
parametrization of temporal states. Second, we have the Aristotle’s prin-
ciple that asserts that duration is inseparable from change, and thus that
denies that changeless duration can exist. Finally, we have the metric-
ity problem, notwithstanding Aristotle’s principle, a relational notion of
time still requires means to fix a determinate metric structure in order
for time to play its functional role in mechanics.
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3 Reparametrization Invariance
The formalism of Newton’s system of mechanics is one of differential
equations. In particular, Newtonian theory features equations between
rates of change of velocity (i.e. acceleration) and forces (e.g. between grav-
itating bodies). When all goes well, these equations can be solved and
the solutions are usually expressed as functions for the position of a
body over time. Most iconically one can derive the elliptical orbits of the
celestial bodes. Newtonian mechanics as written in terms of force laws
and differential equations is extremely cumbersome in practice. One of
the most important developments in eighteenth and nineteenth century
mathematics was in reformulating Newtonian mechanics as a theory of
variational principles. The essential idea is to represent the possible states
of a mechanical system in an abstract high-dimensional space (a possi-
bility space) and to represent possible histories as curves in this space.
Physical possibilities are then picked out via restrictions on the curves.
One of the most important variational formulations of mechanics is the
‘Lagrangian formulation’. In this formulation the possibility space, la-
belled TC, is made up of 6n-dimensions where n is the number of par-
ticles in the system. If we have three particles then we would have 18
dimensions. To describe a particle, labelled with an index i = 1, ..., n,
we specify the spatial position, qi and velocity, q˙i. Since space is three
dimensional each of these quantities requires three numbers to be spec-
ified – it is vectorial – this is indicated by the bold typeface. All together
we end up with 2× 3× n = 6n. Paths, γ, through this 6n dimensional
possibility space are mappings between the set of real numbers and TC;
i.e. we have that γ : R → TC. We can pick out a privileged group of
physical paths by use of an action functional, S(γ), which is defined via
the integration of the Lagrangian functional along the path:
S(qi, t)] =
∫
γ
L(qi, t)dt (1)
The physical paths are those that have an extremal action, δS = 0. This
idea of an extremal action is a subtle one, and lies at the heart of all vari-
ational approaches to mechanics. Most significantly, variational prin-
ciples of extremal action supply us with a nomological restriction of
which curves in the possibility space are physically possible.4
The Lagrangian description of mechanics makes use of a temporal
parameter in two senses: first, within the definition of the velocities,
q˙i =
dqi
dt ; and second, within the time labelling of the curves in the pos-
sibility space – their parametrization. This representation of time conflicts
with Leibniz’s view since in this formalism time is something more than
order of successions: the formalism allows us to represent distinct pos-
sibilities that have the same sequence of states of affairs but a different
4See (Smart and The´bault 2015) for discussion of extremal action principles and the
metaphysics of laws of nature.
5
rate at which the states are passed through. This is precisely the pos-
sibility that Clarke asserts and Leibniz denies. We can think about this
notion of duration is in terms of the existence of a privileged temporal
metric. That is, an absolute temporal distance measure. Such a structure
also implies an order of successions in terms of a monotonic parame-
terisation of instantaneous states. Thus, the problem with Lagrangian
mechanics from a Leibnizian relational viewpoint is one of excess tem-
poral structure.
Fascinatingly for our purposes, not long after the Lagrangian for-
malism was developed (principally by Lagrange himself but also by
Hamiltonian) a modification of the theory by Jacobi was made that al-
lows more naturally for a Leibnizian viewpoint.5 The first step is to
expand our possibility space and treat time as an additional coordinate,
q0 = t, in a 6n+ 2 dimensional extended possibility space. Velocities in this
space are then defined for all of the qµ by differentiation with respect
to an arbitrary parameter τ so we have that q ′µ =
dqµ
dτ , µ = 0, ..., n. This
arbitrary parameter is also taken to vary monotonically along curves in
extended configuration space: it is an arbitrary label for an (undirected)
ordered succession. An important property of extended mechanics is
that it is physically invariant under re-scalings of the parameter τ. The-
ories which display such a dynamic insensitivity to parameterisation
are said to be reparametrization invariant.
We can associate the time coordinate t (q0) in extended mechanics
with the value taken by a clock external to our mechanical system. In
the case of an open system such an interpretation would seem appropri-
ate; but what about if the system is a closed subsystem of the universe?
– or even the universe as a whole? In this case there is clearly no physi-
cal basis for an external clock and as such we would look to eliminate q0
as an independent variable. We can do this by the process of Routhian
reduction.6 Applying Routhian reduction to extended mechanics leads
to a new Jacobi formalism that has a possibility space of the same dimen-
sions as the Lagrangian formalism we started with, i.e. 6n. The Jacobi
formalism also features the same set of possible instantaneous states.
The difference is that this process of expansion and reduction has lead
to a further constraint that the total energy is zero. This constraint is
directly related to the fact that our new Jacobi formalism has retained
the reparametrization invariance of the extended formalism. In fact, it
can be show that for any theory that is reparametrization invariant, the
Hamiltonian function, which represents the total energy, must be zero.7.
5The classic formal treatments of the Jacobi formalism in the literature are are
(Lanczos 1970, §5), (Johns 2005, §11-12) and (Rovelli 2004, §3.1).
6A fuller discussion of Routhian reduction in general, and in this case in particular,
is given in (Lanczos 1970, §5) and (Arnold, Kozlov, and A.I. 1988, §3.s2).
7More precisely, reparametrization invariance of the action by definition implies
that the Lagrange density is homogeneous of order 1 in the velocities. This, via Eu-
ler’s homogeneous function theorem, then implies that the Hamiltonian density must
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These two features – zero Hamiltonian and reparametrization invari-
ance – are at the heart of the problem of time in quantum gravity. They
are also, of course, directly related to the Leibnizian viewpoint on time.
If time is only relational order of successions then we should demand
that a theory of mechanics is reparametrization invariant and thus has
a zero Hamiltonian.
4 The Global Problem of Time
A standard, and rather misleading, way of introducing the problem of
time in quantum gravity is to make reference to a ‘deep conceptual
conflict’ between the treatment of time within the two great pillars of
modern physics: quantum theory and general relativity. The problem,
it is supposed, arises from forcing a background independent theory of
spacetime onto the Procrustean bed of quantization with respect to a
background time. For some vague, and rather mysterious, reason it is
supposed that time simply disappears when we attempt to understand
gravity within a quantum framework. Although such a view is difficult
to countenance in any substantive sense, it does contain an important
kernel of truth. Neither quantization nor gravity are fundamentally at
the heart of the problem of time. Rather the problem arises generically
from the manipulation of a particular class of classical theories, that
includes general relativity, according to the standard formal steps that
are preparatory for quantization. That is, the problem of time becomes
apparent in the process of preparing any reparametrization invariant
theory for quantization.
Here we have most in mind two different paths towards quan-
tization: i) Schro¨dinger’s early and rather heuristic route via the
Hamiltonian-Jacobi formalism; and ii) the more rigorous canonical
quantization techniques which were first developed by Dirac and von
Neumann in the 1920s, and subsequently extended to the case of the-
ories with constraints by Dirac in the 1950s (Dirac 1964a). In each case
one chooses a particular classical formulation of a theory and then ap-
plies a standard recipe to transform to the quantum domain. In each
case, when we consider a reparametrization invariant theory the prob-
lem of time’s disappearance becomes apparent before the transformation
is applied.
The Hamiltonian formulation of mechanics makes use of a 6n di-
mensional possibility space: ‘phase space’. Each point is made up of a
pairing of a position and canonical momentum variable. Canonical mo-
mentum is a vectorial quantity possess by each particle and given by
the expression, pi = ∂L∂q˙i with i = 1, ..., n. Each point in our phase space
can then be specified as Γ ∈ x = (qi, pi) and curves, as before, can be
vanish; or, rather, that it be proportional to a constraint (Dirac 1964a)
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taken to represent histories of physical systems.
It is possible within the Hamiltonian framework to provide the
nomological restriction to physical curves that represent physically pos-
sible histories in terms of a variational principle. However, it is also
possible to provide the relevant nomology in terms of the evolution of
an algebra of observables. Any quantity that can be measured can be rep-
resented as a function that maps between points in phase space and
the space of real numbers, f : Γ → R. These functions are called ob-
servables and together they form the algebra of observables, O(Γ). The
most important observable is energy, and the function that represents
total energy is the Hamiltonian function, H, that we met earlier. Now
consider any other observable, f . If we want to know how f changes
with time, in Hamiltonian mechanics all we have to do is calculate the
Poisson bracket between H and f . This is simply given by:
{ f , H} =
n
∑
i=1
∂ f
∂qi
∂H
∂pi
− ∂ f
∂pi
∂H
∂qi
= f˙ (2)
The observables form an algebra precisely because the Poisson bracket
is a binary operation that takes any pairing of observable functions and
returns a third. The Poisson bracket has a deep physical and mathe-
matical significance and there is an important sense in which it is one
of the key ‘heuristic structures’ upon which quantum mechanics was
constructed (Saunders 1993) – we will meet another in terms of the
Hamilton-Jacobi principal functional shortly.
Essentially the idea is that a classical algebra of observable func-
tions, O(Γ), can be used as a platform upon which to construct a quan-
tum algebra of observable operators, Aˆ ∈ A(H). The former being de-
fined upon phase space, Γ, (a smooth manifold), the latter being defined
upon Hilbert space, H (a normed vector space equipped with an inner
product). Just as points, x, in the phase space classical states, vectors
in the Hilbert space, |ψ〉, represent quantum states. Whereas the Pois-
son bracket, {, } plays the role of the binary operation in the classical
observable algebra, the commutator, [, ], plays the role of the binary op-
eration in the quantum observables algebra. The commutator takes two
quantum observable operators and returns a third:
[Aˆ1, Aˆ2] = ih¯Aˆ3 (3)
where h¯ is Planck’s constant dived by 2pi. The crucial connection be-
tween the two algebras is encoded in the relation:
[Aˆ f , Aˆg] = ih¯Aˆ{ f ,g} (4)
Formally speaking quantization, the process of constructing a quantum
from a classical theory, takes many forms. One of the best understood
and most widely used is canonical quantization. This is the method
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of quantization that starts from the Poisson bracket and the Hamilto-
nian formalism and proceeds to the quantum regime by this identifica-
tion between the two bracket structures (technically this is a Lie algebra
morphism).
As mentioned above, canonical quantization in its original form is
not applicable to theories where there are constraints on the phase
space, and this of course includes reparametrization invariant theories,
within which the Hamiltonian is itself a constraint. Dirac’s methodol-
ogy for the quantization of constrained Hamiltonian theories is rather
too complicated to go into full detail in this short chapter.8 However, by
reference to the concept of an algebra of observables introduced above
we can outline one key ingredient, and in doing so give a first, rather
schematic, presentation of the problem of time. The idea is that for the-
ories with constraints, all elements of the algebra of observables must
have zero Poisson bracket with the constraints – they must commute
with the constraints.9 For reparametrization invariant theories, the idea
is thus to consider a sub-algebra, P ⊂ O, made up of functions with
vanishing Poisson bracket with the Hamiltonian g ∈ P , where g : Γ→ R
such that,
{g, H} = g˙ = 0. (5)
Such functions correspond to observable quantities that do not change
over time. The restriction to observables that commute with the Hamil-
tonian amounts to a restriction that anything that is physically measurable
cannot change. We will call these functions perennials after the coinage
of the Czech physicist Karel Kucharˇ – see (Kucharˇ 1999) – they are
also often referred to in the literature as Dirac observables. According
to most standard accounts, the problem of time can be explained in
terms the equivalence between the observables and perennials within
the Hamiltonian formulations of reparametrization invariant theories.
That is, when we recast theories such as the Jacobi theory – or in fact
general relativity – into a Hamiltonian form, so the argument goes, there
are ‘good formal reasons’ to believe that the set of observables is equiv-
alent to the set of perennials. In this sense, change is no longer part of
our Hamiltonian theory! Clearly, whether or not we accept this argu-
ment depends very much upon detailed analysis of these ‘good formal
reasons’. Such an analysis would requires us to take a rather large de-
tour into the technicalities of constrained Hamiltonian mechanics and
we will not proceed in this direction here.10 Rather we will consider the
8For the classic textbook dicussions see (Dirac 1964b; Henneaux and Teitelboim
1992).
9Being more precise, the observables must ‘weakly commute’, meaning that the
Poisson bracket must be zero only on the sub-manifold of phase space that the con-
straints define.
10In essence, the question is whether of not we should understand Hamiltonian
constraints as generating unphysical ‘gauge’ transformations that do no change the
physical state. Whilst, the majority opinion dating back to Dirac is that we should
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classical global problem of time in the context of the Hamilton-Jacobi
formalism, such that the connection with quantum problem of time is
immediately apparent.
The Hamiltonian system of mechanics that we introduced earlier
has behind it a rich and beautiful geometrical structure. Much of this
structure is in fact encoded in the Poisson bracket itself, and relates to
ideas from symplectic geometry which we will not discuss here.11 The
most important geometrical idea is that of a generating functional. These
are objects based upon which we can generate transformations of the
entire phase space into different, but physically equivalent, canonical co-
ordinates.12 Such transformations are particularly useful when they are
chosen such that the dynamics in the new coordinates takes a partic-
ularly simple form. More specifically, if we label the old coordinates
(qi, pi) and the new coordinates (Qi,Pi), then what we would like to
find is a transformation such that Q˙i = 0. That is, the new position
coordinates are constants of the motion. It can be proved that the gen-
erating functional that performs this task is given by a time dependent
function of a mix of the old and new coordinates, S1(t,qi,Qi) that solves
the Hamilton-Jacobi equation:
H
(
qi,
∂S1(t,qi,Qi)
∂qi
)
=
∂S1(t,qi,Qi)
∂t
(6)
The function S1 is called the principal functional. The usual trick to solve
the Hamiltonian equation is use the Ansatz for the principal functional,
S1(t, q,Q) = Et+W(q,Q). This reduces the problem to one of calculat-
ing the characteristic functional, W(q,Q), that solves the equation:
H
(
qi,
∂W(qi,Qi)
∂qi
)
= 0 , (7)
The last two equations give us a means to characterise the problem of
time. According to one view the hallmark of reparametrization invari-
ant theories is that the Hamilton-Jacobi principal functional, S1(t,qi,Qi),
should be identified with the characteristic functional W(qi,Qi).13 That
is we only have a ‘timeless’ equation of the form:
H
(
qi,
∂S1(qi,Qi)
∂qi
)
= 0 , (8)
Given this equation as basic to the Hamilton-Jacobi formalism of
reparametrization invariant theories there is then a precise sense in
– see for example (Rovelli 2004) – various authors have also put forward arguments
that we should not (Kuchar˘ 1991; Barbour 1994; Pons 2005; Pooley 2006; Barbour and
Foster 2008; Gryb and The´bault 2014; Pitts 2014b).
11See (The´bault 2011) for a discussion of the problem of time specifically in the
context of symplectic mechanics.
12Here and below we are following (Arnold 2013, §9). See also (Lanczos 1970, §8).
13See in particular (Rovelli 2004, §3.2).
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which even a Leibnizian notion of ordered succession is unavailable.
In a theory of mechanics described by (6), the parameter t marks out
a (one dimensional) ordered family of canonical transformations that
trivialise the dynamics. In a theory of mechanics described by (8) there
is only one such transformation, and thus all time itself is trivialised by
our canonical transformation. Which of these two formalisms is a more
adequate rendition of reparametrization invariant mechanics is thus a
question of crucial importance and marks the divide between the two
responses to the global problem of time as discussed in the next section.
Starting from the Hamilton-Jacobi formalism there is a reliable
heuristic, dating back to Schro¨dinger, that takes us from the Hamilton-
Jacobi principal functional to the wavefunction (Rund 1966, pp. 99-
109).14 Essentially, one considers families of hypersurfaces of constant
value of the characteristic function as wavefronts propagating in con-
figuration space with respect to the time parameter. The crucial step
is then to interpret these wavefronts as surfaces of constant phase of a
complex valued wavefunction on configuration space evolving with re-
spect time. This means one takes the principal functional S1(t, q,Q) as
the basis for a complex wavefunction Ψ(t), defined on a Hilbert space
labelled by the eigenvalues of a complete observables and the time pa-
rameter t. Applying this heuristic to Equation (6) leads directly to the
Schro¨dinger equation:
Hˆ |Ψ〉 = ih¯∂ |Ψ〉
∂t
. (9)
On the other hand, starting from Equation (8), we are lead to an equa-
tion of the form:
Hˆ |ψ〉 = 0. (10)
This is a simple form of the famous Wheeler-DeWitt equation.15 The
Wheeler-DeWitt equation provides us with a ‘frozen formalism’ for
quantum theory, and thus a problem of recovering time evolution. It
describes a quantum system trapped in an energy eigenstate with the
wavefunction a time independent function. How should we respond to
this problem? Below we will discuss two options.16 The first is to at-
tempt to abstract an internal notion of time evolution based upon the
Wheeler-DeWitt type formalism together with classical internal clocks.
The second is to avoid passage to the frozen formalism in the first place.
Each of these options will be discussed in the following section.
14See (Butterfield 2005) for philosophical discussion.
15The full Wheeler-DeWitt equation for general relativity can be derived via an ex-
actly analogous line of reasoning based upon the the Einstein-Hamilton-Jacobi equa-
tion (Peres 1962; DeWitt 1967).
16See (Isham 1992; Kuchar˘ 1991; Anderson 2012) for discussion of further ap-
proaches.
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5 Finding Time Again
The staring point in our search for lost time is an iconic quote from the
great nineteenth century German thinker Ernst Mach (1883):
It is utterly beyond our power to measure the changes of
things by time. Quite the contrary, time is an abstraction, at
which we arrive by means of the changes of things; made
because we are not restricted to any one definite measure,
all being interconnected.
Following the Mittelstaedt–Barbour (Mittelstaedt 1976; Barbour 1993)
interpretation of Mach, we can take such quotes to motivate a view in
which a consistent notion of time can be abstracted from the ‘changes
of things’ in a manner such that the inherently interconnected nature of
every possible internal measure of time is accounted for. According to
the Mittelstaedt–Barbour interpretation, we can understand this ‘second
Mach’s principle’ as motivating a relational notion of time that is not
merely ontologically parasitic on change, but also equitable, in that it
can be derived uniquely from the motions of the entire system taken to-
gether. Thus, any isolated system – and, in fact, the universe as a whole
– should have its own natural clock emergent from the dynamics. This
form of relationalism involves a relative notion of duration as abstracted
from change. For there to be a notion of time in the this sense it is not
enough to be merely a structure of temporal relations: our emergent
time must also be unique and equitable. We cannot, therefore, merely
identify an isolated subsystem as our relational clock, since to do so is
not only non-unique but would also lead to an inequitable measure, in-
sensitive to the dynamics of the clock system itself. Such sentiments are,
to a large extent, consistent with the Leibnizian view of time discussed
in the first section. Most obviously, we have Aristotle’s principle of in-
separability of duration from change. Furthermore, in assuming that
there is a unique method for abstracting duration from change, we also
assume that there is an absolute ordering within the change; otherwise
the abstraction process would be underdetermined. This means that the
second Mach’s principle ultimately involves the assumption of temporal
ordering structure equivalent to a monotonic time parametrization.
Recall from the first section, that a crucial problem that we identi-
fied was for the relationalist to fix a determinate metric structure such
that time can play its functional role in mechanics. Fascinatingly, it is
precisely in addressing this question that a relationalist response to the
global problem of time can be formulated. In particular, in various for-
mal and philosophical treatments spanning five decades Barbour (to-
gether with collaborators) has put forward a relationalist programme
for mechanics that is self-identified as in the spirit of both Leibniz and
Mach.17 We do not have space here to conduct a lengthly analysis of
17A selection of Barbour’s key works are: (Barbour 1974; Barbour and Bertotti 1982;
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Barbour’s views, rather we shall consider a particular formal step made
in response to the classical global problem of time and discussed in
(Barbour and Foster 2008). First we re-consider the evolution equation
for an observable function in a theory invariant under time reparam-
eterizations but this time re-writing the total differential in terms of
infinitesimal changes:18
δg
δt
= {g, H} (11)
Barbour and Foster insist that, contra Dirac, this equation should not
be set to zero. Rather, we take the change in the observable to be real
even though it may be arbitrarily parameterized. Furthermore, Barbour
and Foster show that can express the change in the observable without
reference to the parametrization at all by rewriting the equation as:
δg =
√
Σiδqi.δqi
2(E−V){g, H} (12)
with E the total energy and V the potential energy. This realises exactly
the idea that Leibniz seems to have had in mind: duration emerges as
a harmonious aggregation of motions. Furthermore, in constructing a
temporal metric from change we arrive at precisely the structure needed
to complete Leibniz’s relational project.
In contrast to the more moderate species of Leibniz-Barbour tempo-
ral relationalism, we can consider a more radical variant of relationalism
which does not involve commitment to temporal ordering. In radical
relationalism about time we assert that what it means for a physical
degree of freedom to change is for it to vary with respect to a second
physical degree of freedom; and there is no sense in which this variation
can be described in absolute, non-relative terms. This radical relation-
alism about time is closely associated with the work of Rovelli19 and
to a large extent the mainstream view in the community of physicists
working on problem of time in quantum gravity. The attractiveness of
the view lies in its connection to a proposal for abstraction of internal
notions of change within fundamentally timeless systems of equations
(both classical and quantum). This proposal in its modern form is based
upon the idea of ‘partial observables’ and ‘complete observables’ and
can be illustrated explicitly using the Hamilton-Jacobi formalism dis-
cussed above.
Consider a globally reparametrization invariant description of n free
particles. The Hamiltonian will take the simple form, H = Σi
p2i
2mi
for
Barbour 1994; Barbour 2001a; Barbour 2001b; Barbour 2009; Barbour, Koslowski, and
Mercati 2014).
18Again, we neglect the ‘weak equality’ for simplicity of exposition.
19See for example (Rovelli 1990; Rovelli 1991; Rovelli 2002; Rovelli 2004; Rovelli 2007;
Rovelli 2014).
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i = 1, ..., n,. Solving the Hamilton-Jacobi equation gives us an expression
for the position variables, qi, as functions of the constants of motion, Qi
and Pi, and time, t. This takes the form:
qi(t) = Qi +
Pi
mi
t (13)
These position variables do not commute with the Hamiltonian and
so are clearly not perennials. This means that, on the standard view,
they should not be considered observables. They do, however, prima
facie, seem to have obvious physical significance since they represent
the spatial degrees of freedom of our system of particles. To emphasise
that such variables are physically significant but not fully observable,
Rovelli calls them ‘partial observables’. By definition a partial observ-
able is ‘a physical quantity with which we can associate a (measuring)
procedure leading to a number’ (Rovelli 2002, p.2). The essence of the
Rovelli internal clock prescription for dealing with the problem of time
is to designate a sub-set of partial observables as internal clocks, and
then use these clocks to construct ‘complete observables’, that are both
predicable and measurable, and which correspond to perennials.
We can illustrate the Rovelli prescription using our simple system
as follows.20 First, restrict to 1D so that each particle is represented
simply by a single scalar position and momentum variable. Next, choose
particle i = 1 as our clock and invert Equation (13) for t to get
t =
m1
P1
(q1 −Q1) (14)
Re-insert this into (13) we get
qa(q1) = Qa − Pama
m1
P1
(q1 −Q1), (15)
for a = 2, ..., n. We then take q1 = τ, where τ ∈ R, to be the value of
an internal clock, and define members of a family of ‘complete observ-
ables’ in terms of qa(τ) for some specified value of τ. Crucially, for any
specification of τ we have, qa(τ) : Γ → R and {H, qa(τ)} = 0, which
means that the complete observables are perennials. Given this, one can
proceed to construct a quantum theory based upon the classical algebra
of complete observables. In the context of this quantum formalism the
complete observables will be constructed as operators on a ‘physical’
Hilbert space made up of states that solve the Wheeler-DeWitt equa-
tion.
20See (Dittrich 2006; Dittrich 2007) for formal refinement of the procedure. Follow-
ing the work of Dittrich the partial and complete observables proposal can be gen-
eralized to systems of multiple constraints via the idea of ‘partially invariant partial
observables’. This idea, combined with the notion of ‘weakly Abelian’ constraints, al-
lows for expression of complete observables of an arbitrary constrained system as an
infinite power series.
14
There are number of conceptual and formal difficulties attached to
the Rovelli proposal.21 Perhaps the most philosophical interesting is
whether the idea of things that are ‘measurable but not predictable’
is coherent. Some authors22 think not:
“...a measurable quantity is always a complete observable,
even pointers of a clock are observables and not partial ob-
servables. Now complete observables are defined with re-
spect to nonmeasurable quantities...which we will simply
call non-observables...” (Thiemann 2007, p.78)
The problem is that, if Thiemann is right and the partial observables
are non-measurable, then we seem to loose our ability to use differ-
ent values of the internal clocks to describe change. Rather, all we have
are measurements of the complete observables which are (in a precise
sense) temporally non-local. Furthermore, in denying the measurabil-
ity of partial observables the internal time view arguably runs into the
Leibnizian relationalist problem in explaining the determinate (local)
metric structure of time at the functional level needed for mechanics.
On the other hand, if Rovelli is right and the partial observables are
measurable, although we do seem to have a good response to the metric-
ity problem, we still need a more precise way of making sense of the
ontological status of things that are ‘measurable but not predictable’.
These fascinating questions have received rather too little philosophical
attention and are still, to a large extent, open. An important exception
to this relative neglect are the various dicussions of Rickles,23 who in
the context of advocating for his own structuralist position, makes the
highly valuable observation that in essence the debate turns on the old
metaphysical question of the relative ontological status of relations and
relata – with Rovelli asserting (and Thiemann denying) the independent
measurability of the relata.24
A further conceptual issue relates to the fact that the complete ob-
servables may be multivalued. That is, we are not-guaranteed that the
partial observable chosen as the internal clock will be monotonically
increasing. This is of course in direct conflict with the Leibniz-Babour
form of relationalism discussed above. Given that we want to preserve
temporal ordering structure, an alternative prescription for dealing with
the problem of time is needed. Recent steps in this direction have been
presented in a series of papers by Gryb and The´bault.25 On the moder-
ate temporal relationalist view defended by Gryb and The´bault, there is
21The most important formal difficulties relate to invertibility and integrability. See
(Bojowald, Ho¨hn, and Tsobanjan 2011; Dittrich, Hoehn, Koslowski, and Nelson 2015).
22(Rickles 2005, p.26) contains a similar observation, made a little earlier
23See in particular (Rickles 2007, pp.161-171) and also related remarks in (Rickles
2005; Rickles 2006a; Rickles 2006b; Rickles 2008; Rickles 2016).
24For further discussion in the context of the physics literature see (Tambornino
et al. 2012; Rovelli 2014)
25See in particular, (Gryb and The´bault 2011; Gryb and The´bault 2014; Gryb and
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always assumed to exist a monotonically increasing time parametriza-
tion, but this parametrization is taken only to be defined up to smooth
rescallings, and thus we do not have an absolute notion of duration.
The Gryb and The´bault view depends upon a particular interpre-
tation of the Hamilton-Jacobi formalism discussed above. In particular,
the view relies upon noting that the difference between Equations (6)
and (7) above is entirely due to an extra time boundary term, namely:
the transformation S → S+ Et. This does not affect the local equations
of motion. At the classical level the two formalisms are observation-
ally indistinguishable, the difference between them reducing to an in-
terpretational choice regarding the energy being a constant of motion
or constant of nature.26 With this in mind, we are then free to choose
which of the two Hamilton-Jacobi formalisms to base our quantum the-
ory upon depending on the form of relationalism about time we which
to adopt. Choosing the more moderate relationalism, and starting from
(6), as discussed above, the resulting quantum formalism will retain a
fundamental notion of time evolution, and we end up with a unitary
evolution equation of the Schro¨dinger-type,
Hˆ |Ψ〉 = ih¯∂ |Ψ〉
∂t
. (16)
The classical algebra of observables through which the quantum for-
malism is defined are given by the partial observables. For our sim-
ple system these can be expressed in terms of equation (13). Clearly
this equation traces out dynamical curves labelled by the arbitrary pa-
rameter t, which is of course itself not an observable. Rather, t is an
independent parameter, and, as such, can be specified independently
of quantities which are deemed measurable within the theory. The
curves defined by (13) are reparametrization invariant even if the equa-
tion makes reference to the unphysical labelling parameter. Thus, the
observables are invariant under the relevant global reparametrization
symmetry. The ‘relational quantization’ procedure developed by Gryb
and The´bault can be motivated in the context of an analysis of glob-
ally time reparametrization theories via Faddeev-Popov path integral
(Gryb and The´bault 2011), constraint quantization (Gryb and The´bault
2014) or Hamilton-Jacobi techniques (Gryb and The´bault 2016). In each
case, the resulting quantum formalism retains a fundamental notion of
Schro¨dinger time evolution and in this sense the attractiveness of the
proposal is obvious.
A severe limitation of relational quantization relates to the ‘local’
problem of time that we have thus far been avoiding in our discussion.
Theories such as the Jacobi theory are globally time reparametrization
invariant and have a single Hamiltonian constraint that generates global
The´bault 2015; Gryb and The´bault 2016).
26See (Gryb and The´bault 2016) for extensive discussion of this point.
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time evolution. Re-foliation invariant theories such as general relativity,
by contrast, are locally time reparametrization invariant, and have an an
infinite family of Hamiltonian constraints that generate local ‘many fin-
gered’ time evolution. Imagine a loaf of bread that we can irregularly
cut up into a sequence of slices. The loaf is spacetime and the slices
are instantaneous spatial surfaces. A foliation is then a parameteriza-
tion of a spacetime by a time ordered sequence of spatial slices. Such
a parametrization is local in the sense that it is defined for every point
on every spatial slice. The symmetries of general relativity imply that
all spacetimes that are related by re-foliations are physically equivalent.
In practice, application of the partial and complete observables pro-
gramme to general relativity also suffers a number of limitations, such
as those relating to integrality (Dittrich, Hoehn, Koslowski, and Nelson
2015). However, in principle, there is no bar to applying the Rovelli pre-
scription for constructing observables to theories invariant under local
time reparametrization transformations. Thus, the partial and complete
observables approach is a prospective solution to the local and global
problem of time. On the other hand, relational quantization is geared
specifically towards the solution of the global problem of time, and ar-
guably in principle inapplicable to the local problem.
The viability of relational quantization as an approach to the the
problem of time in any full theory of quantum gravity thus rests upon
the adoption of a re-description of gravity in terms of a formalism that
features a notion of preferred foliation. One attractive possibility along
these lines is suggested by the shape dynamics formalism.27 Within this
formalism, the principle of local (spatial) scale invariance is introduced
with the consequence of favouring a particular notion of simultane-
ity. This selects a unique global Hamiltonian and thus allows for re-
lational quantization to be applied. Shape dynamics is based upon a re-
codification of the physical degrees of freedom of general relativity via
exploitation of a duality between the two relevant sets of symmetries.
In the class of spacetimes where it is possible to move from one formal-
ism to the other (those that are ‘CMC foliable’) the physical degrees of
freedom described by the two formalisms are provably equivalent, they
are merely clothed in different descriptive redundancy.
Our two options for ‘finding time’ thus both come with a mix of
attractive and unattractive features. Arguably, relational quantization
is more attractive than partial and complete observables on account of
clearer ontological categories for the observables. And arguably par-
tial and complete observables is more attractive than relational quan-
tization on account of flexibility it gives in dealing with local time
reparametrization invariance. In the end, the choice between the two
27Shape dynamics was originally devloped by Barbour and collaborators (Barbour
2003; Anderson, Barbour, Foster, and O’Murchadha 2003; Anderson, Barbour, Foster,
Kelleher, and O’Murchadha 2005) and then brought into modern form in (Gomes,
Gryb, and Koslowski 2011).
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is underdetermined by the choice between the relational ontologies of
time, one with temporal ordering structure, one without. As is so often
in science, future theoretical and empirical development is the only real
prospect to decisively break such underdetermination.
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